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Abstract 
 
We argue, due to the conspicuous failure of Washington Consensus-guided 
reforms in most part of the developing world in 1990s and the outbreak of the 
current global financial crisis, Washington Consensus, as a general term of the 
neoliberal free market economic thinking, has been withering. In the meantime, 
Chinese economic model has gain wide recognition and praise worldwide. 
Joshua C. Ramo coined the term of Beijing Consensus as an alternative 
approach to economic development for developing nations. There has been hot 
debate on the notion of Beijing Consensus. We argue even though there are 
some problems in Ramo’s original definition of Beijing Consensus, we should 
not reject this notion altogether. Instead, we should try to come up with better 
conceptualizations of this term. In this paper, we sum up ten general principles 
of the Chinese development model as our new definition of the Beijing 
Consensus. 
 
Keywords: Washington consensus, Beijing consensus, China, development 
model, economic reform. 
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1. The fall of the Washington Consensus 
In the 1960s and 70s, in order to finance their ambitious industrialization, 
many Latin American countries, notably Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, 
borrowed hugely from international creditors, much of which were short-term 
loans. When the accumulation of their foreign debts reached a dangerous level 
at the end of 70s, the world economy went into a serious recession during 
1979-1982, in which, recorded high interest rates in the US and Europe made 
Latin America’s debt payments unbearable. In August 1982, Mexico declared a 
moratorium on debt service, which within weeks caused the whole region 
immersed in later we call the debt crisis. Since then, Latin America has had a 
‘lost decade’: although different efforts were made, they had not succeeded in 
either reducing foreign debt or growing their way out of debt (Vásquez, 1996). 
In 1989, when George H. W. Bush became the US president, his 
Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady announced a new plan to resolve the debt 
crisis, which urged Latin American debtor countries to implement market 
liberalizations in exchange for a ‘voluntary’ reduction of the commercial bank 
debts (Vásquez, 1996). In order to understand to what extent Latin American 
policy reforms were being implemented, a conference under the title ‘Latin 
American adjustment: How much has happened?’ was convened by the 
Institute for International Economics in November 1989 (Kuczynski, 2003). As 
the organizer of this conference, John Williamson wrote a background paper 
‘What Washington means by policy reform’ to guide the commissioned country 
studies of individual Latin American debtor countries.  In this paper, Williamson 
laid out ten major policy reforms he believed to have reached ‘a reasonable 
degree of consensus’ in Washington as needed to restore Latin American 
economic growth (Williamson, 1990).  
The list of ten policy recommendations that was termed by Williamson as 
‘Washington consensus’ included fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure 
priorities, tax reform, liberalizing interest rates, a competitive exchange rate, 
trade liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, 
privatization, deregulation and property rights (Williamson, 2004). However, as 
Williamson later lamented that the concept of Washington Consensus had 
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become ‘public property’ (Williamson, 2000:252) and ‘has been used to mean 
very different things by different people’ (Williamson, 2004). He identified two 
versions that are very different from his original Washington Consensus. One 
version refers to the policies the Bretton Woods institutions applied towards 
their client countries, or perhaps the attitude of the US government plus the 
Bretton Woods institutions (i.e., the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank). Another version uses Washington Consensus as a synonym for 
neo-liberalism or market fundamentalism (Williamson, 2004).  
Williamson pointed out in the early days after 1989 there was not much 
difference between Bretton Woods Institutions policy package applied to their 
client countries and his original concept of Washington Consensus. But 
overtime their policy package deviated substantively, for instance, their adoption 
of a bipolar doctrine of exchange rate, according to which countries should 
either float their exchange rate cleanly or else fix it firmly, is directly counter to 
Williamson’s original call for a competitive exchange rate implying an 
intermediate regime. Another terrible deviation Williamson singled out is that 
Bretton Woods institutions, or at least the IMF, came in the mid-1990s to urge 
client countries to liberalize their capital accounts, which, Williamson believes, 
bears the major responsibility for causing the Asian financial Crisis of 1997. 
With the disastrous performance of the ‘Shock Therapy’ reforms in Eastern 
European and former Soviet Union countries (EEFSU) in 1990s, strongly 
advocated by the US Treasury and IMF, Bretton Woods institutions’ version of 
Washington Consensus was widely discredited. 
Williamson regards the association of Washington Consensus with neo-
liberalism or market fundamentalism as ‘a thoroughly objectionable perversion’ 
of his original version (Williamson, 2004) because neither he included most of 
the neoliberal innovations of the Reagan administration in the US and Thatcher 
government in the UK, except privatization, nor he believes that any of those 
distinctively neoliberal policies, such as supply-side economics, monetarism, 
and minimal government, commanded much of a consensus (Williamson, 2004). 
However, the association of Washington Consensus with neo-liberalism or free 
market economics eventually has become the most widespread usage of the 
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term. The current global financial crisis rooted in the US is widely seen to have 
announced the fall of the free market or neo-liberal economics. Following the 
2009 G-20 London summit, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown declared ‘the 
Washington Consensus is over’. Williamson believes Brown’s critique on 
Washington Consensus actually refers to this neoliberal reinterpretation, rather 
than his original version (Williamson, 2009).  
Even John Williamson has repeatedly defended his original version of 
Washington Consensus as ‘motherhood and apple pie’, he recognizes ‘the 
disappointing performance of many countries that made a conscientious 
attempt to implement the sort of reform agenda’ of his original Washington 
Consensus and he has identified three defects in his formula: first, his original 
Washington Consensus did not emphasize crisis avoidance; second, there is 
incompleteness in his original reform agenda and a second-generation of 
reforms is needed; third, the objective that underlay the original Washington 
Consensus was excessively narrow (Williamson, 2002). No matter which 
version of Washington Consensus people use, Harvard professor Dani Rodrik 
(2006) has argued that ‘the debate now is not over whether the Washington 
Consensus is dead or alive, but over what will replace it’. 
2. The debate of the Beijing Consensus 
Among those critics of Washington Consensus, Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel 
Prize winning economist, may be the most famous one. In 1998, as the chief 
economist of the World Bank, Stiglitz criticized ‘the policies advanced by the 
Washington consensus are not complete, and they are sometimes misguided’ 
and called for a ‘post-Washington consensus’ (Stiglitz, 1998). 
China’s phenomenal economic growth since its reform and opening up 
and the sharp contrast to the disappointing performance of most part of the 
developing world in 1990s (World Bank, 2005) makes China’s development 
model distinctive and attractive. In 2004, a British think tank the Foreign Policy 
Centre published a paper titled ‘The Beijing Consensus’, the author Joshua 
Cooper Ramo, a former editor of Time magazine, argues that China’s rise is 
remaking the international order and what is happening in China is not only a 
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model for China, but a path for other nations around the world. At the heart of 
his conceptualization of the Beijing Consensus, which Ramo claimed to replace 
the widely-discredited Washington Consensus, are three theorems: first, 
innovation-based development; second, giving sustainability and equality 
priority; third, self-determination in international relations.   
Given China’s success and increasing influence, the notion of Beijing 
Consensus, once created, has generated widespread attention in China and 
beyond. Many people see Chinese model distinctive and successful and 
therefore representing an alternative way of development. China’s economic 
miracle is now something that many countries in Africa, Latin America and other 
parts of Asia would like to emulate (Colley, 2009). Leaders of Vietnam, India, 
Russia, Iran, Brazil, among others, have shown interests in ‘Beijing Consensus’ 
(Huang and Ding, 2006: 29). Professor David Schweickart of Loyola University 
Chicago even argues that ‘of all the countries in the world today, China is one of 
the best situated to make the transition to’ what he terms ‘Economic 
Democracy’, a viable, equitable market socialist society beyond capitalism 
featuring workplace democracy and social control of investment (Schweickart, 
2005). 
While many people highly praise Chinese experience, many others have 
expressed their disagreements of the concept of Beijing Consensus. There are 
five major arguments. First of all, Chinese development model has many 
problems (Dirlik, 2006), such as high consumption of energy and resources, 
environmental pollution, income disparity, regional disparity, corruption, etc. 
Secondly, China’s success has many China-specific conditions others do not 
have, such as abundant rural labor and overseas Chinese who contributed 
much initial FDI to China, so China’s success cannot be easily duplicated. 
Thirdly, China does not have a step-by-step plan in its reform so there is no 
consensus at all (cf. Huang, 2005). Fourthly, some people argue the essence of 
the Beijing Consensus is authoritarian government plus market economy (Nye, 
2005). Since regime theory holds that authoritarian systems are inherently 
fragile (Nathan, 2003: 6), some people believe the rule of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) may collapse. Thus, the Beijing Consensus cannot 
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replay the Washington Consensus. Finally, some people argue Ramo’s 
conceptualization of Beijing Consensus is ‘relatively incoherent and largely 
inaccurate (Kennedy, 2008: 10). 
We disagree with above arguments. For the charge that Chinese model 
is flawed, we support Colley’s (2009) viewpoint that many people (especially in 
the West) tend to see China’s development as a glass half empty or largely 
focus on the negative aspects of China’s development. Admittedly, there are 
many serious challenges facing China, but they are problems of the 
development process. No country can grow without problems. It is not easy to 
have made such a progress in a short period for a country like China with a 
1.3bn population and starting from a very poor basis. Moreover, Chinese 
leaders have been aware of these problems and switching to a more scientific 
development strategy. Colley (2009)pointed out ‘when Chinese leader like Wen 
Jiabao talk of “putting people first” and developing a “harmonious society” they 
tend to mean it’. 
It is a fact that China has some unique initial conditions; however, people 
may have overstated their contribution to the success of China’s reform. We 
believe the more important is the way China has been reforming its economy. 
For instance, most economists have finally realized that political stability is 
crucial for a successful economic transition and that prudential financial reform 
is much better than a ‘big bang’ financial liberalization, which are part of the 
Chinese experience and significant contribution to economic thinking. Therefore, 
even without the similar initial conditions, developing countries can still learn 
something really valuable from China, albeit a duplicated success cannot be 
guaranteed.   
It is also not precise to say China does not have a step-by-step plan in its 
reform, in two ways. For one thing, it is impossible for businesses to make 
detailed action plans, needless to say for a country. But this does not mean 
there is no plan at all. In fact, China regularly make five-year plan, ten-year plan, 
and long-rang plan. For another, people like to quote Deng Xiaoping’s famous 
saying ‘crossing the river by groping the stones’ to prove China does not have 
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any plan. In fact, China did rely on trial and error at the early stage of its reform 
due to lack of experience, but Chinese leaders have gradually reached a 
common vision and grand strategy which was made national guiding policy – 
building a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics. We believe, 
even if there were a step-by-step plan in China, no country should blindly copy it. 
One important experience from China has been that a country should adapt any 
best practice to its own conditions.  
It is true that China is an authoritarian regime because China is still a 
party-state in which the CCP penetrates all other institutions and makes policy 
for all realms of action (Nathan, 2003: 13). However, as Nathan (2003) has 
clearly illustrated that, by institutionalizing norm-bound succession practice, 
meritocracy-based promotion and institutional differentiation with the regime, 
Chinese authoritarian system has proven to be resilient, therefore it is too-hasty 
to argue that Chinese regime cannot adapt and survive. Nathan (2003) even 
argues the Chinese case may suggest that authoritarianism is a viable regime 
form even under conditions of advanced modernization and integration with the 
global economy. We share this prospect. In the mean time, we also share 
Zhao’s (2004) viewpoint that Beijing Consensus should be a complement rather 
than a substitution to the Washington Consensus. Williamson (2009) rightly 
points out ‘most of the governments of the world seem to be determined to 
follow the precepts originally enshrined in my ten points under the Washington 
Consensus heading, irrespective of the ritual condemnations by their leaders’. 
We appreciate that the original Washington Consensus represents conditions 
under which a mature economy can operate more efficiently. Then, the Beijing 
Consensus can provide a viable route towards there. This is the value of the 
Beijing Consensus, i.e., enriching our thinking on development economics.   
We agree that Ramo’s conceptualization of Beijing Consensus has some 
problems.  On the one hand, his three ‘theorems’ are not accurate. Clearly, 
China is not yet an innovative country and China’s economic success has not 
been innovation-driven so far, although Chinese leaders have long realized 
innovation is very important and made efforts to build its national innovation 
system (OECD, 2007). On the other, its three ‘theorems’ do not parallel those 
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ten policy reforms of the original Washington Consensus (Kennedy, 2005: 10). 
Williamson’s Washington Consensus is only about economic reform while the 
third theorem of Ramo’s Beijing Consensus, using asymmetric power projection 
to achieve global balance of power, is according to himself ‘a new security 
doctrine’. The fact that the term consensus has a hegemonic connotation (Dirlik, 
2006) is because the Washington Consensus was put forward deliberately and 
systematically (Wu, 2005). As China has repeatedly promised to rise peacefully 
and not to pursue hegemony and Chinese government does not say much on 
exporting China’s developmental model (Colley, 2009), we think Ramo’s third 
theorem can hardly achieve a consensus in Beijing and should not be promoted 
as something the developing country can learn. 
We believe the flaws of the original conceptualization of Beijing 
Consensus should not be used to justify the rejection of the notion altogether. 
What we need to do is instead to come up with a sound new configuration. We 
intend to contribute to the redefining the concept in this paper. In the following 
section, we lay out ten general principles that we believe command a moderate 
degree of consensus in Beijing. We acknowledge there might be more factors 
than these ten principles that have contributed to Chinese success, but we 
believe these ten principles are more widely accepted and represent more 
general policies rather than China-specific or technical factors. We are also very 
aware that these ten principles should be viewed as a flexible guidance rather 
than rigid recipe for any other country to copy. At the end of the day, what really 
makes a difference is how a country creatively adapts the best practice learned 
from other place to its own national situations.  
3. Ten principles as the Beijing Consensus 
Principle one: Localization of best practices borrowed 
Chinese leaders firmly believe that, due to the different stages of 
development, developing nations face very different conditions and many 
constraints in economic construction, compared with developed countries (and 
differences also exist within developing world), therefore, any textbook 
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economic theories and other countries’ experiences should be adapted to their 
local situations, rather than copied without caution. Blindly imitating the so-
called best-practice theories and policies without taking local conditions into 
consideration may result in unexpected outcomes. 
During Mao Zedong’s era, Chinese leaders were aware of this 
localization or adaptation principle. Mao himself wrote an important policy paper 
‘On Ten Great Relationships’ in 1956 to warn his Party not to blindly imitate but 
to adapt Stalinist model to Chinese domestic conditions. Some scholars argue 
that due to this cautious approach China adopted an M-Form1 (Qian and Xu, 
1993; Yusuf, 1994: 75) instead of Soviet U-Form economic administration 
structure, and therefore Chinese local governments had much autonomy and 
incentive in building their local economies. This facilitated a fairly rapid GDP 
growth even with the political disorder and disrupt during the ten-year Cultural 
Revolution.  
This adaptation thinking is also evident in post-Mao reform and opening 
up. Although being called by Mao as ’the number two  top leader walking the 
capitalist road in the Party’, Deng Xiaoping from the beginning of his reform 
rejected the idea of wholesale westernization and firmly chose a strategy 
suitable to China’s real conditions, thereby successfully avoiding the disastrous 
failure of the Shock Therapy reform the EEFSU had suffered. Jiang Zemin and 
Hu Jintao also followed this principle consistently. Although the general 
direction of China’s reform after Deng is moving towards a liberal market 
economy, as many scholars have pointed out, Chinese socio-economic system 
has always kept its own characteristics. 
This very first principle of localization clearly indicates that the Beijing 
Consensus is fundamentally different from the Washington Consensus in that 
China does not promote universal application of its development model and 
therefore China does not pursue hegemonic power of the Beijing Consensus 
vis-à-vis the Washington Consensus.   
                                                            
1 M-form and U-form are concepts of Organization Theory. In M-form organization, there are multiple 
autonomous divisions and the headquarter does not interfere much in the decision-making of individual 
divisions. In U-form organization, the general manager exerts tight control through different functions, 
like finance, sales, operations, and marketing, etc.  
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Principle two: Combination of market and plan 
Every nation should not be fettered by extreme ideology, i.e., free-market 
capitalism or fully-planned communism, in its economic construction. Any 
economy inevitably is or should be a mixed one in which both market and plan 
have a role to play. Either market or plan in isolation will ultimately fail due to 
information asymmetry2 and economic calculation problem3. Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (1986) argue that it is only under exceptional circumstances that markets 
are efficient. Stiglitz (2002) also recognizes that the government is not always 
able to correct the limitations of markets. Therefore, the remedy to the doomed 
failure is to find the right balance between the market and government, i.e., a 
combination of market and plan. 
The essence of using market is to induce competition for an efficient 
allocation of resources and effective mechanism of survival of the fittest. It is for 
this purpose that Deng Xiaoping made the decision of opening China up to the 
world and returning to the GATT and later joining the WTO. One key success 
factor of China’s market reform and opening up is the sequence and emphasis 
of liberalization and competition. It is obviously important to import investment 
and technology while giving proper degree of protection to some strategically 
important industries, such as financial industry and agriculture.  
Mao and especially the Gang of Four tried to completely abolish the 
market mechanism as they saw it as an attachment of capitalism. An extreme 
example of this purely Communist thinking was to put all people into People’s 
Communes where the central administration of the Commune had the power to 
decide everything concerning the life and work of commune members. With its 
huge failure, Deng Xiaoping realized that it was meaningless and misleading to 
debate whether a policy is capitalist or socialist and the final judgment should 
be ‘the Three Helpfuls’, i.e., whether such a policy is helpful for developing 
                                                            
2 In 2001, the Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph E. 
Stiglitz ‘for their analyses of markets with asymmetric information’. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_asymmetry  
3 Hayek (1944) argues that central planners will never have enough information to carry out resource 
allocation reliably. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_calculation_problem  
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socialist productivity, for enhancing socialist comprehensive national power, and 
for improving people’s living standard4.  
On the other hand, free-market economy evidently failed in 1930s’s 
Great Depression. In helping to understand and overcome the crisis, the 
Keynesian Revolution of economics helped the world to appreciate that 
macroeconomic intervention is necessary at some point in time and in some 
economic context. The most recent lesson we had of blindly believing ‘free-
market will maximize public welfare’ (Adam Smith’s (1776) ‘invisible hand’ 
theory) is the global financial crisis caused by the US credit crisis. The US 
700bn bailout plan and a called-for global coordinated rescue plan once again 
prove government planning and market mechanism are both viable and 
necessary. 
Chen Yun once used his by now famous bird cage allegory to describe 
the desired relationship between plan and market in Chinese economic 
development trajectory (Brødsgaard, 1991). According to Chen Yun the plan is 
the cage and the market the bird in the cage. If the cage is too tight the bird 
cannot move and will eventually suffocate. If there is no cage the bird will fly 
away. Chen Yun used his position as the second most important leader in 
China, only next to Deng Xiaoping during the 1980s and 1990s, to push for a 
reform of ‘caged marketization’, which proved to be prudential and successful.  
Principle three: Flexible means to a common end 
Western economic theories and policies have their merits, but they are 
based on the better conditions of developed markets. Hence, even though the 
general direction for developing countries’ economic transition is to converge to 
those theories and policies, the route and pace of the transition or convergence 
will be much more complex than what the Western economic theorists have 
imagined and expected. Therefore the reform should be gradualist in design 
and flexible in execution. 
                                                            
4 Source: http://www1.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/shizheng/252/5303/5304/20010626/497655.html 
[accessed on 29 November 2008] 
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Compared with EEFSU’s ‘Shock Therapy’ reforms based on Washington 
Consensus, China has chosen a gradualist approach to economic reform. The 
basic features of such a Chinese gradualist reform are: reforming the easier first 
and harder latter, experimenting in smaller area first, incrementally moving 
forward, using dual track for gradual transition (P. Li, 2005). There has been a 
consensus in Beijing that gradualist reform is an ideal approach to maintain 
stability and avoid reform risk for a big country like China.  
Chinese leaders themselves did not expect the complexity of economic 
reform at the outset. Their initial plan was to complete the reform within 5 to 10 
years or at latest by 19955 (Zhang, 2008). Also, during the last 30 years of 
reform (still not yet completed), China has had three rounds of hot debates on 
how and whether to reform 6 . In the 1980s, China’s reform was seen as 
‘liberalization in odd years and anti-liberalization in even years’ (Zhu, 2007). The 
most recent reform debate started in 2004 even triggered the anti-reform voices 
(Zhu, 2007). All of these show the complex nature of the reform process.  
Deng Xiaoping was a flexible pragmatist. The very idea of economic 
reform was a break away from the Maoist economic model. Although many 
Party leaders wanted to reform, it was a taboo at the early years of reform to 
spell out the failure of Mao’s policies. Deng’s flexibility was to uphold the banner 
of ‘Mao Zedong Thought’ – the CCP’s official theory under Mao’s leadership – 
on the one hand and to reinterpret Maoism as ‘freeing your mind and finding the 
truth from the fact’ on the other. Therefore Deng’s reform strategy was 
legitimated as a continuity and development of Maoism, essentially 
guaranteeing the long-term continuation of the reform process.  
Another evidence of the power of the flexibility principle is the great idea 
and policy of ‘one country, two systems’, which Deng Xiaoping created for 
handling the issue of the return of Hong Kong and Macau in 1980s. To many 
people inside and outside China during that time, capitalism and socialism were 
as incompatible as water and fire. The British Prime Minister Thatcher even 
                                                            
5 Source: http://www.tianjindaily.com.cn/epaper/mrxb/mrxb/2008-06/24/content_5748912.htm [accessed 
on 30 November 2008] 
6 Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-02/13/content_4173007.htm [accessed on 30 
November 2008] 
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used this as an excuse to argue for keeping Hong Kong at the rein of British 
hands. Facing this knotty problem, Deng devised the ‘one country, two systems’ 
theory to unite seemingly conflicting systems. 
Principle four: Policy rights 
The Chinese leaders consistently argue that every nation should have 
the freedom to choose its own strategy and polices of building its economy. 
Therefore China does not allow other countries to dictate China’s domestic 
policies and in the mean time China promises not to intervene other countries’.  
After the beginning of China’s reform in 1978-1979, the first time a 
Chinese leader announced this view in an international occasion was in Premier 
Zhao Ziyang’s speech at the on the International Meeting on Cooperation and 
Development7 at Cancun city of Mexico on 22 October 1981.  Zhao stated 
China’s Five Principles on International Cooperation8, the fourth of which was 
‘developing countries have the rights to choose development strategies 
according to their domestic conditions; and developed nations should not make 
the domestic reform of developing countries as the precondition of establishing 
the new world order’.  
When it comes to international aid, China’s no-strings-attached approach 
is in sharp contrast to that of the Western powers which includes strict aid 
conditionality. In the 1990s, most of the Washington Consensus-based reforms 
worldwide failed to deliver the expected outcomes (cf. World Bank, 2005), which 
helped make the Chinese development model attractive to the Global South. To 
many developing countries, China offers not only an effective model of 
economic development but also ‘a new model for South-South cooperation’ 
(Wen, 2006) which is based on ‘peaceful coexistence, equality, and respect for 
the social systems, sovereignty, and independence of [other nations]’ and 
China’s willingness ‘to provide assistance without any political strings attached’ 
(Wesley-Smith, 2007: 23).  
                                                            
7 This was the first international conference on cooperation and development where 14 developing 
countries including PR China and 8 developed nations attended. 
8 Source: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64165/70486/70508/4943078.html [accessed on 1 
December 2008] 
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This argument concerning the freedom of choosing one’s own domestic 
policies argument is also supported by many development economists and is 
referred to as ‘policy rights’ (Alice Amsden, forthcoming; Crook, 2003; Perales, 
2004: 416). Stiglitz (1998: 14) argues ‘if policies are to be sustainable, 
developing countries must claim ownership of them’. Chinese government has 
been consistently following this ‘no interference’ approach when dealing with 
international affairs and ‘no string attached’ approach when granting 
international aid. 
A strong argument is that the policy rights or freedom was fully enjoyed in 
the history of industrialization of today’s developed countries, e.g., UK, France, 
US, Germany, Japan, and the Newly Industrialized Countries and Economies 
(South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan) (Wade, 2004). Therefore, it 
is not right for the developed nations to ‘kick away the ladder’ (Chang, 2002) for 
the developing countries and force them to accept some international rules 
designed for protecting the interests of the advanced nations (Stiglitz, 2000, 
2003; Wade, 1996, 2001, 2002).  
Principle five: Stable political environment 
Chinese leaders have been well aware that a stable political environment 
domestically and internationally is a precondition for economic development9. 
So while economic reform has taken big steps forward, political reform has 
proceeded much more cautiously10. According to ‘Jiang Zemin’s Thought of 
Three Representations’11, one party ruling is not the problem as long as the 
Chinese Communist Party represents the development needs of advanced 
production forces, the direction of advanced culture, and the basic interests of 
                                                            
9 Even the anti-socialist and anti-collectivist economist and political philosophy Friedrich Hayek once 
admitted ‘Well, I would say that, as long-term institutions, I am totally against dictatorships. But a 
dictatorship may be a necessary system for a transitional period. At times it is necessary for a country to 
have, for a time, some form or other of dictatorial power’ (source: 
http://www.fahayek.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=121 [accessed on 29 November 
2008]. 
10 Deng Xiaoping called for political reform in 1980 and in 1986 he wanted to have a substantial start of 
political reform, however, the conservative forces within the Party succeeded in putting off such a bold 
move.  
11 Source: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/21/content_699933.htm [accessed on 1 December 
2008] 
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the majority of Chinese people. In China, the official slogan is ‘stability 
overwhelms anything else’. Many scholars now agree that one important reason 
behind China’s fast economic growth in recent years has been its relatively 
stable domestic political environment (Naughton and Yang, 2004; Brødsgaard 
and Zheng, 2004; Nathan, 2003). The increased stability and predictability of 
Chinese politics was evidenced in China’s rule-based and orderly transition 
from the Third to Fourth generation of political leaders (Brødsgaard, 2004).  
Some Washington-Consensus-minded scholars prescribed that political 
reform must precede economic reform because political institutions will directly 
impact on every economic transaction (North, 1990), therefore getting the 
institutions right first can ensure minimized transaction costs (cf. Coase, 1937; 
Williamson, 1975). However, what they did not understand about the dynamics 
of the relationship between political environment and economic development is 
that these two are essentially mutually dependent and mutually constraining 
and reshaping one another.  
An example of the positive mutually-reshaping relationship is the Chinese 
reform performance where Yusuf (1994: 73) notices ‘a cycle of economic and 
political reform has become apparent’. China started off reform firstly in the 
economic domain, and thanks to the relatively stable domestic political 
environment, the successful economic performance now enables China 
‘gradually engineering political adjustments’ of ‘a process of managed 
democratization’ (Gosset, 2006). To Chinese, a vivid case of the negative 
dynamics between political and economic reforms was the disastrous outcome 
of the EEFSU’s ‘Shock Therapy’ reform which was based on the idea of 
‘political reform comes first’.  
Principle six: Self-reliance 
Chinese leaders always emphasize and encourage diligence and self-
reliance. Mao enthusiastically praised the great potential of Chinese people’s 
wisdom and creativity. In Mao’s thinking, only people are the main source of 
generation of material wealth, scientific technology, and social progress. 
Chinese leadership after Mao inherited this self-reliance principle. Deng 
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Xiaoping in 1984 pointed out ‘in order to develop, we must mainly rely on 
ourselves while opening up can attract foreign capital and technology as a 
supplement to our socialism’ (cited in Q. Li, 2008: 37). On 17 November 2006, 
Chinese President Hu Jintao expressed at the APEC CEO Summit 2006 that 
‘China’s development is mainly based on self-reliance and Chinese people’s 
hard-work. In the meantime, China unshakably implements the opening-up 
policy, and executes reciprocal and win-win opening-up strategy’12.  
Due to the Cold War international order after the Second World War, 
Socialist China at its birth faced immense difficulties in its economic 
development and nation building. During the isolation and blockade by the West 
led by the US in 1950s, China relied on the Soviet Union for economic help and 
assistance. However with deterioration of the China-Soviet relations from the 
early 1960s, China was forced to fully rely on her own efforts. But this forced 
self-reliance helped unite the whole Chinese people and created a sense of 
common destiny. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping announced to open door to the 
outside world in order to import foreign capital, technology and management 
knowhow. After the 1989 Tiananmen student movement, Western countries led 
by the US started to block China, and China had to once again rely on herself. 
One negative case is the policy of ‘market exchanges for technology’ started in 
1992 (Lan, 2005). After more than ten years practice, Chinese leaders realized 
this policy has almost failed and China has to rely on herself to develop 
advanced manufacturing industries (Mei, 2009).  
Chinese are said to have enormous, what Singapore’s ex-leader Lee 
Kuan Yew commented, ‘endurance and stamina needed for sustained efforts’ 
(cited in Ramo, 2004: 65), and whose culture ‘enjoins you to endure hardship 
and have the stamina to struggle on in a cohesive society where the individual 
subsumes himself for the benefit of the family and his society’ (cited in Ramo, 
2004: 67). The history of China’s reform has proven the importance of self-
reliance as well as learning from others.  
                                                            
12 Source: News of the Communist Party of China, available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64094/5057874.html [accessed on 27 November 2008] 
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Principle seven: Constantly upgrading industry 
Chinese leadership knows well the importance of upgrading industrial 
portfolio. This is exactly the idea of, what Lee Kuan Yew put straightforward in 
an interview with Joshua Ramo: ‘we tried import substitution for a short while, 
we were making toothbrushes, mosquito coils, some shirts and garments, but it 
wasn’t going to make us a living’ (cited in Ramo, 2004: 71). A former Japanese 
Ministry of Finance official Masaki Shiratori (1993) echoes this wisdom by 
arguing ’a latecomer to industrialization cannot afford to leave everything to the 
market mechanism 13 . The trial and error inherent in market-driven 
industrialization is too risky and expensive considering the scarcity of resources’ 
(cited in Wade, 1996: 29).  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to make a detailed argument why 
some industries are more important than some others. Briefly put, certain 
strategic industries, say, capital-intensive, knowledge-intensive and high-tech 
industries, are more important than others for several reasons. Firstly, these 
industries offer more space for technological learning, such as electronics, 
biochemical, and new material industries, etc. Secondly, these industries add 
more realizable value into their products hence generate more profit14, such as 
software, financial services, designing and marketing industries, etc. Thirdly, 
high-tech industries will have much more potential for export growth (Fagerberg, 
Srholec, and Knell, 2007) with a rising terms of trade. Fourthly, technology 
sophisticated industries may have positive externality or spillover effect to other 
domestic industries. During the 1950s China adopted a development strategy 
which focused on heavy-industrial growth and massive investments. During the 
reform period attempts have been made to channel more resources into 
agriculture and light industry (Brødsgaard, 1991).  
                                                            
13 Stiglitz (1998:11) points out two major market failures in developing countries: ‘left to itself, the 
market will tend to underprovide human capital’ and ‘technology’, which are crucial factors for economic 
development.  
14 Chinese ex-Minister for Commerce emotionally commented that ‘Chinese people need to produce 800 
million shirts in order to exchange an A380 plane’. His calculation was based on the harsh reality that the 
profit margin for a Chinese made shirt was only 0.35 US dollar. Source: 
http://www.scol.com.cn/comment/bbsnr/20060208/200628153736.htm [accessed on 25 November 2008] 
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It is worth noting that it is necessary to foster competition (Stiglitz, 1998: 
7) among firms as well as among industries if a successful industrial upgrading 
strategy is to succeed. During the reform period, even though China has 
opened its door to let foreign companies invest and operate in China, there has 
been a reluctance to open up strategically important sectors such as finance, 
telecommunication, steel and power generation. However, the current 
leadership realizes that Chinese industry needs to start competing on the global 
level playing field and has defined a group of 120 major companies (‘national 
champions’) that should be developed into major international players (Nolan, 
2001). 
Principle 8: Indigenous innovation 
A corollary of the need for constant upgrading industry is the demand for 
indigenous innovation. This point is the first theorem in Ramo’s original analysis 
of the Beijing Consensus (Ramo, 2004: 11). Ramo writes: ‘[r]ather than the “old-
physics” argument that developing countries must start development with 
trailing-edge technology (copper wires), it insists that on the necessity of 
bleeding-edge innovation (fiber optic) to create change that moves faster than 
the problems change creates. In physics terms, it is about using innovation to 
reduce the friction-losses of reform’ (Ramo, 2004: 12).  
China has invested heavily in education and technology. China used to 
rely more on technology import and transfer, but has realized it is crucial to 
develop the country’s  own innovation capabilities in order to compete in today’s 
fast-changing world (Fagerberg, Srholec, and Knell, 2007). China has now been 
geared to develop her national innovation system where her intention and 
strategy is to gradually transit from a government-centered to an enterprise-
centered innovation web (OECD, 2007). Some policy instruments for stimulating 
indigenous innovation are protecting intellectual property rights (IPR), fiscal 
decentralization and tax reform which fuelled up the incentives needed to each 
level of local governments. 
It is worth noting that innovation is not just about technological innovation, 
but also about institutional innovation as well as. Since the reform in 1978 China 
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has shown considerable abilities in institutional innovation and reform. As the 
decentralized social structure and reform leaders support experimentation, 
Chinese society has rehabilitated the ability to innovate from below. Significantly, 
Chinese peasants have made several institutional innovations, such as the 
household contract responsibility system (HCRS), township and village 
enterprises (TVE), self-governance in village, rural special cooperatives, 
collective forest rights reform, etc15. In respect to the urban reform, Chinese 
leaders invented the ‘dual-track system’ which ensured a much more smooth 
transition from centrally-planned to a market economy compared with the big-
bang reform in EEFSU. Some scholars highly praised this institutional 
innovation as a Pareto-improving method (Lau, Qian, and Roland, 2000).  
Principle 9: Prudent financial liberalization 
China has been so prudent and cautious when it comes to liberalization 
of financial market that China still has not yet opened her capital account.  This 
might be partly because China has lacked the experience of managing stock 
and other financial markets, and partly because Chinese leadership is worried 
about losing control of her strategic national assets. But the most important 
reason is that Chinese leaders understand the enormous risk of a rapid financial 
liberalization.  
Chinese leaders’ cautions and worries have been warranted by the chilly 
reality that those countries that have liberalized too quickly or relaxed 
regulations on financial markets have had to bear painful losses due to 
unexpected financial crises. One may point to the Latin American debt crisis in 
1980s and 1990s, the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the Russian financial crisis 
in 1998, and most recently the global financial crisis in 2008 caused by US 
subprime crisis.  
What puzzles Chinese leaders is how come the rest of the world (LA, EA, 
EU, and US) has not learnt a lesson from the string of financial crises in the last 
two decades of 20th century? To Chinese leaders, the main culprit of the global 
                                                            
15 Source: China’s official Xinhua news agency website, available at: 
 http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2008-10/08/content_10165611.htm [accessed on 25 November 2008] 
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financial crisis was the blind belief in free market. Ironically, in his speech at the 
Manhattan Institute on 13 November 2008 ‘on the eve of’ of the G20 summit, 
the former US president George W. Bush ‘fervently defended U.S.-style free 
enterprise’ as ‘not the cause’ but rather ‘the cure’ for the world's financial chaos 
(Feller, 2008). 
Principle ten: Economic growth for social harmony 
Chinese leaders are enthusiastic about building a harmonious society 
and they believe they can achieve this by effectively growing the economy first. 
This belief can be traced back to the birth of the New China in 1949. Mao spent 
his whole life to explore a road toward a prosperous and strong China in which 
the Chinese people could enjoy a happy and equal life. Harmony in Mao’s mind 
might mean no oppression and no exploitation. Based on this belief, he tried to 
make the oppressed stand up, the proletariat control the means of production, 
and the bourgeoisie deprived everything. The way of realizing his harmonious 
society proved to be wrong and had disastrous consequences, but it could be 
argued that his vision was clear, for instance, he even believed by cultural 
revolution he could find a way from total chaos to total harmony (cong tian xia 
da luan dao tian xia da zhi).  
Deng Xiaoping inherited Mao’s vision but took another direction. Deng 
allowed part of people to get rich first and reminded his Party never to forget his 
vision: let the people and regions who became rich first help the less wealthy 
people/regions to prosper and develop together. Deng Xiaoping and Jiang 
Zemin have effectively encouraged a part of Chinese people to get rich first, 
which in fact prepared the material basis for the new generation of Chinese 
leadership led by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao to take on the 
task of ‘making all Chinese prosper together’. Hu and Wen have so far had a 
good start – they brought forth a new development plan called ‘constructing a 
harmonious socialist society’, which we argue will have far-reaching impact on 
China’s peaceful rise in the 21st century. Part of this new development plan 
would be to correct the big income disparities that have emerged as a 
consequence of letting some people and regions prosper first. 
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Although we list this principle as the last one, it actually is very important 
because it indicates the ultimate purpose of reform and development. Chinese 
leaders since Mao have never lost their grand vision: to build a prosperous, 
democratic and civilized socialist country. Many westerners criticize China lacks 
democracy, human rights and freedom. However, we believe, it takes time for a 
huge country like China to realize its transformation from an underdeveloped 
semi-colonized and semi-feudal country to an advanced modernized nation. 
What we have learned from Chinese story is China has prioritized economic 
development at the earlier stage and has gradually moved towards coordinated 
economic and social development when they feel they have accumulated 
sufficient material resources in the earlier stage. The best evidence is China’s 
strategic switch to a strategy of building a harmonious society domestically and 
a harmonious world internationally in the beginning of 21st century.  
 
Reference 
Amsden, A. forthcoming. 'Preface: Role Models, Policy “Rights”, and Peace', A 
Farewell to Theory: How Developing Countries Learn from Each Other 
Brødsgaard, K.E. 1991. ‘China’s Political Economy in the Nineties’, China 
Report, 27(3): 177-196 
Brødsgaard, K.E. 2004. ‘Jiang Finally Steps Down: A Note on Military Personnel 
Changes and the CCP’s Governing Capacity,’ The Copenhagen Journal of 
Asian Studies, 19: 82-88 
Brødsgaard, K.E. and Zheng, Y. (eds) 2004. Bringing the Party Back In: The 
Role of the CCP in Governing China. London: Routledge 
Chang, H. J. (2002) Kicking away the Ladder: Development Strategies in 
Historical Perspective, London: Anthem 
Coase, 1937, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, Economica, New Series, Vol. 4, No. 16 
(Nov., 1937), pp. 386-405 
22 Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2009 - 29    
Colley, C. 2009. ‘China’s reforms at 30 and the “Beijing Consensus”’, 
Pambazuka News, China-Africa Watch section, 2009-01-31, Issue 417, 
available at: http://pambazuka.org/en/category/africa_china/53757 
Crook, C. 2003. ‘A cruel sea of capital. A survey of global finance’, The 
Economist, 3 May 
Dirlik, A. 2006. “Beijing Consensus: Beijing ‘Gongshi.’ Who Recognizes Whom 
and to What End?” Position Paper, Globalization and Autonomy Online 
Compendium, January 17, available at: 
http://www.globalautonomy.ca/global1/position.jsp?index=PP_Dirlik_BeijingC
onsensus.xml 
Fagerberg, J., Srholec, M. and Knell, M. 2007. ‘The Competitiveness of Nations: 
Why Some Countries Prosper While Others Fall Behind?’, World 
Development, 35(10): 1595-1620 
Feller, B. 2008. ‘Bush defends capitalism on eve of economic summit’, 
Associated Press, 13 November, available at:  
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5hT-
MwpK6QSoOPF74bGFqnUl_HVuwD94ED1J80 [accessed on 25 November 
2008] 
Greenwald, B. C. and Stiglitz, J. E. 1986. ‘Externalities in Economies with 
Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets’, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 101(2): 229-264 
Gosset, D. 2006. ‘The Dragon’s metamorphosis’, The Asian Times, December 9 
Huang, P. 2005. ‘Beijing gongshi haishi Zhongguo jingyan’(‘Beijing Consensus 
or Chinese experience?’), Tian Ya, No. 6. available at: 
http://theory.people.com.cn/GB/40557/54488/54489/3802568.html [accessed 
on 6 May 2009]  
Huang, Y. and Ding, S. 2006. ‘Dragon’s underbelly: An analysis of China’s soft 
power’, East Asia, 23(4): 22-44 
Kennedy, S. (2008) ‘The myth of the Beijing Consensus’, 1st draft, paper 
presented on the 6th International Symposium of the Centre for China-US 
  Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2009 - 29  23 
Cooperation, May 30-31, 2008, Denver, Colorado, USA, available at:  
http://www.indiana.edu/~rccpb/Myth%20Paper%20May%2008.pdf [accessed 
on 26 November 2008 
Kuczynski, P. 2003. ‘Setting the stage’, in  P. Kuczynski and J. Williamson (eds) 
After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin 
America. Peterson Institute 
Lau, L. J., Qian, Y. and Roland, G. 2000. ‘Reform without Losers: An 
interpretation of China’s dual-track approach to transition’, Journal of Political 
Economy, 108(1): 120-143 
Lan, H. 2005. ‘The past and present of ‘market exchanges for technology’, 
Global Fiancial Watch, 24 April (in Chinese), available at: 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/review/observe/20050322/19011451207.shtml 
[accessed on 7 May 2009] 
Li, Peilin, 2005. ‘The meaning and basic elements of the ”Chinese experience”’, 
Newspaper of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 17 November 2005, 
available at: http://www.cass.net.cn/file/2005111751529.html (‘”Zhongguo 
jingyan” de neihan he jiben yaodian’, Zhongguo Shehui Kexueyuan Yuanbao) 
Li, Qinggang, 2008. ‘On Deng’s thought of “China should make a greater 
contribution to humankind”’, The Journal of Yunnan Provincial Committee 
School of the CPC, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 36-39 
Mei, X. 2009. ‘China’s strategy under the global trade protectionism’, China 
News Week, 5 May (in Chinese) available at: 
http://blog.ifeng.com/article/2321611.html [accessed on 7 May 2009] 
Naughton, B. and Yang, D. (Eds) 2004. Holding China Together. Diversity and 
National Integration in the Post-Deng Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
Nathan, A. 2003. ‘Authoritarian Resilience’, Journal of Democracy, 14(1): 6-17 
North, D. C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 
24 Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2009 - 29    
Nolan, P. 2001. China and the Global Economy. London: Palgrave 
Nye, J. S. 2005. ‘The rise of China’s soft power’, Wall Street Journal Asia, 
December 29 
OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) 2007. 
OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: China - Synthesis Report. OECD 
Sanahuja Perales, J. A. S. 2004. ‘Consensus, dissensus, confusion: the “Stiglitz 
debate” in perspective – a review essay’, Development in Practice, 14(3): 
412-423 
Qian, Y. and Xu, C.-G. 1993. ‘Why China's economic reforms differ: the m-form 
hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector’, Discussion Paper No. 
154, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, London, UK, available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/3755/ 
[accessed on 30 November 2008] 
Ramo, J. C. 2004. The Beijing Consensus. London: The Foreign Policy Centre 
Rodrik, D. 2006. ‘Goodbye Washington Consensus, hello Washington 
Confusion? A review of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: 
Learning from a Decade of Reform’, Journal of Economic Literature, 44(4): 
973-987 
Schweickart, D. 2005. ‘You can’t get there from here: Reflections on the “Beijing 
Consensus”’, paper presented on the International Symposium on the ‘China 
Model or Beijing Consensus for Development’, Tianjing Normal University, 
Tianjing, China, August 8, 2005, available at: 
http://www.luc.edu/faculty/dschwei/beijingconsensus.pdf  
Shiratori, M. 1993. ‘The role of government in economic development: 
Comments on the “East Asian Miracle” study’, paper presented to OECF 
seminar on the East Asian Miracle, Tokyo, 3 December 1993 
Smith, A. 1776/1965. The Wealth of Nations. New York: Modern Library 
Stiglitz, J. 1998. ‘More Instruments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the 
Post-Washington Consensus’, The 1998 WIDER Annual Lecture, Helsinki, 
  Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2009 - 29  25 
Finland, January 7, 1998, available at: 
http://www.adelinotorres.com/desenvolvimento/STIGLITZ-
Consenso%20de%20Washington.pdf 
Stiglitz, J. 2000. ‘What I learned at the world economic crisis. The Insider’, The 
New Republic, 17 April 
 Stiglitz, J. 2003. ‘Challenging the Washington Consensus’, The Brown Journal 
of World Affairs, 9(2): 33-40 
Vásquez, I. 1996. ‘The Brady Plan and market-based solutions to debt crises’, 
The Cato Journal, 16(2): 1-9 
Wade, R. 1996. ‘Japan, the World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance: 
The East Asian Miracle in Political Perspective’, New Left Review, (I/217): 3-
36 
Wade, R. 2001. ‘Showdown at the World Bank’, New Left Review 7, (January–
February): 124–37 
Wade, R. 2002. ‘US hegemony and the World Bank: the fight over people and 
ideas’, Review of international political economy, 9(2): 215-243 
Wade, R. 2004. ‘Introduction to the 2003 paperback edition: creating capitalism’, 
in R. Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of 
Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press 
Wen Jiabao 2006 ‘Win-win cooperation for common development’, Keynote 
speech, China-Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and 
Cooperation Forum, Nadi, Fiji, April 5, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-04/05/content_4385969.htm 
Wesley-Smith, T. 2007. China in Oceania: New forces in Pacific politics. 
Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center 
Williamson, J. 1990. ‘What Washington means by policy reform’, in J. 
Williamson (eds) Latin American adjustment: How much has happened. 
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics 
26 Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2009 - 29    
Williamson, J. 2000. ‘What should the World Bank think about the Washington 
Consensus’, The World Bank Research Observer, 15(2): 251-264 
Williamson, J. 2002. ‘Did the Washington Consensus Fail’. Outline of remarks at 
the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Nov 6, 2002, available at: 
http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=
488 
Williamson, J. 2004. ‘A short history of the Washington Consensus’, paper 
presented on the conference “From the Washington Consensus to a new 
Global Governance”, Barcelona, Spain, September 24-25, 2004 
Williamson, J. 2009. ‘The “Washington Consensus”: Another Near-Death 
Experience?’, available at: http://www.iie.com/realtime/?p=604 
Williamson, O. E. 1975. Markets and hierarchies. New York: Free Press 
World Bank 2005. Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of 
Reform. Washington D. C.: The World Bank 
Wu, S. 2005. ‘The “Washington Consensus” and “Beijing Consensus”’, People’s 
Daily Online, 2005-06-18, available at: 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200506/18/eng20050618_190947.html 
Yusuf, S. 1994. ‘China’s macroeconomic performance and management during 
transition’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(2): 71-92 
Zagha, R. and Nankani, G. T. (eds) 2005. Economic growth in the 1990s: 
learning from a decade of reform. World Bank Publications 
Zhang, W. (eds) 2008. Zhong Guo Gai Ge 30 Nian. Shanghai Renmin 
Chubanshe (30 years of China’s reform. Shanghai: Shanghai People Press) 
Zhao, X. 2004. ‘From Washington Consensus to Beijing Consensus’, Nan feng 
Window, No. 4, July 16, 2004 (in Chinese) 
Zhu, X. (2007) ‘Jidang 30 Nian: Gaige Kaifang de Jingyan Zongjie’, (Exciting 30 
years: experiences and lessons from reform and opening up), Lingnan Forum 
Lecture, 15 December, Guangzhou, Guangdong, available at: 
  Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers 2009 - 29  27 
http://www.nddaily.com/special/lingnanforum/speech/200712/t20071217_603
531.shtml [accessed on 30 November 2008]   
 
 
COPENHAGEN DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
2005: 
 
2005-1 May: Can–Seng Ooi - Orientalists Imaginations and Touristification of 
Museums: Experiences from Singapore 
 
2005-2 June: Verner Worm, Xiaojun Xu, and Jai B. P. Sinha - Moderating Effects 
of Culture in Transfer of Knowledge: A Case of Danish Multinationals and their 
Subsidiaries in P. R. China and India  
 
2005-3 June: Peter Wad - Global Challenges and Local Responses: Trade 
Unions in the Korean and Malaysian Auto Industries 
 
2005-4 November: Lenore Lyons - Making Citizen Babies for Papa: Feminist 
Responses to Reproductive Policy in Singapore 
 
 
2006: 
 
2006-5 April: Juliette Koning - On Being “Chinese Overseas”: the Case of 
Chinese Indonesian Entrepreneurs  
 
2006-6 April: Mads Holst Jensen - Serve the People! Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) in China 
 
2006-7 April: Edmund Terence Gomez - Malaysian Investments in China: 
Transnationalism and the ‘Chineseness’ of Enterprise Development 
 
2006-8 April: Kate Hannan - China’s Trade Relations with the US and the EU 
WTO Membership, Free Markets (?), Agricultural Subsidies and Clothing, Textile 
and Footwear Quotas 
 
2006-9 May: Can- Seng Ooi - Tales From Two Countries: The Place Branding of 
Denmark and Singapore 
 
2006-10 May: Gordon C. K. Cheung - Identity: In Searching the Meaning of 
Chineseness in Greater China 
 
2006-11 May: Heidi Dahles - ‘Chineseness’ as a Competitive Disadvantage, 
Singapore Chinese business strategies after failing in China 
 
2006-12 June: Émile Kok- Kheng Yeoh - Development Policy, Demographic 
Diversity and Interregional Disparities in China 
2006-13 June: Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt - China’s "soft power" re-
emergence in Southeast Asia 
 
2006-14 September: Michael Jacobsen - Beyond Chinese Capitalism: Re-
Conceptualising Notions of Chinese-ness in a Southeast Asian Business cum 
Societal Context  
 
2006-15 October: Ng Beoy Kui - The Economic Rise of China: Its Threats and 
Opportunities from the Perspective of Southeast Asia 
 
 
2007: 
 
2007-16 February: Michael Jacobsen - Navigating between Disaggregating 
Nation States and Entrenching Processes of Globalisation: Reconceptualising 
the Chinese Diaspora in Southeast Asia 
  
2007-17 April: Émile Kok-Kheng Yeoh, Shuat-Mei Ooi - China-ASEAN Free 
Trade Area: Implications for Sino-Malaysian Economic Relations 
 
2007-18 May: John Ravenhill, Yang Jiang - China’s Move to Preferential Trading: 
An Extension of Chinese Network Power? 
 
2007-19 May: Peter J. Peverelli - Port of Rotterdam in Chinese Eyes 
 
2007-20 June: Chengxin Pan - What is Chinese about Chinese Business? 
Implications for U.S. Responses to China’s Rise 
 
2007-21 September: Charles S. Costello III - The Irony of the Crane: Labour 
Issues in the Construction Industry in the New China 
 
2007-22 October: Evelyn Devadason - Malaysia-China Network Trade: A Note 
on Product Upgrading 
 
2007-23 October: LooSee Beh - Administrative Reform: Issues of Ethics and 
Governance in Malaysia and China 
 
2007-24 November: Zhao Hong - China- U.S. Oil Rivalry in Africa 
 
 
2008: 
 
2008-25 January: Émile Kok-Kheng Yeoh - Ethnoregional Disparities, Fiscal 
Decentralization and Political Transition: The case of China 
   
2008-26 February: Ng Beoy Kui - The Economic Emergence of China: Strategic 
Policy Implications for Southeast Asia  
 
2008-27 September: Verner Worm - Chinese Personality: Center in a Network  
 
 
2009: 
 
2009-28 July: Xin Li, Verner Worm - Building China’s soft power for a peaceful 
rise 
 
2009-29 July: Xin Li, Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard, Michael Jacobsen  - Redefining 
Beijing Consensus: Ten general principles 
 
 
